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Abstract: There are few things in our lives we dis-
like or hate so strongly as pain. On the other hand, 
the symptoms of the patients suffered from so-called 
congenital analgesia teach us that if we are deprived 
of the ability to feel pain, our lives would be unbe-
lievably miserable and disastrous. In this way, if we 
try to understand the meaning and the value of pain, 
it seems we immediately find a paradox. The para-
doxical character of pain is reflected in philosophical 
discussions between subjectivist’s and objectivist’s 
view of pain. In this paper, I try to show that the 
seemingly paradoxical character emerges because 
we are obsessed by groundless prejudice that the 
concept of pain must have one definite single mean-
ing and that if phenomena of pain can be understood 
as multidimensional, the various characteristics of 
pain can be interpreted as various aspects of multi-
dimensional pain experiences. 
Keywords: Pain. Philosophy of mind. Tactile expe-
rience. Erwin Strauss.
Resumen: Hay pocas cosas en nuestras vidas que 
nos desagraden u odiemos tan fuertemente como el 
dolor. Por otro lado, los síntomas de los pacientes 
que padecen la llamada analgesia congénita nos 
enseñan que, si nos privamos de la capacidad de 
sentir dolor, nuestras vidas serían increíblemente 
miserables y desastrosas. De esta manera, si 
tratamos de comprender el significado y el valor del 
dolor parece que encontramos inmediatamente una 
paradoja. El carácter paradójico del dolor se refleja 
en discusiones filosóficas entre la visión del dolor 
subjetivista y objetivista. En este trabajo, trato de 
mostrar que el carácter aparentemente paradójico 
surge porque estamos obsesionados por el prejuicio 
infundado de que el concepto de dolor debe tener un 
único significado definido; y que, si los fenómenos 
de dolor pueden entenderse como multidimensio-
nales, las diversas características del dolor pueden 
ser interpretadas como varios aspectos de expe-
riencias de dolor multidimensionales. 
Palabras clave: Dolor. Filosofía de la mente. 
Experiencia táctil. Erwin Strauss. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There are few things in our lives we dislike or hate so strongly as pain. 
Whenever we are assaulted by pain, we try to get rid of it as soon as possible. 
The long history of medicine has been a history of the battle against pain. 
Jeremy Bentham wrote that Nature placed humankind “under the governance 
of two sovereign masters: pain and pleasure”, regarding pain as the main 
factor of the unhappiness and evil in our lives. It seems that everyone 
believes that a life possessed by pain is unbearable and that a life without 
pain would be the best and happiest one in this world. 
On the other hand, it is also well known that if we are deprived of the 
ability to feel pain, our lives would be unbelievably miserable and disastrous. 
The most dramatic and frightening evidence comes from a consideration of 
people who suffer from so-called congenital analgesia, although such 
conditions as leprosy, diabetes, alcoholism, multiple sclerosis, nerve 
disorders, and spinal cord injury can also bring about the strange hazardous 
state of insensitivity to pain. 
Many of these people sustain extensive burns, bruises, and lacerations during 
childhood, frequently bite deep into their tongues while chewing food, and learn only 
with difficulty to avoid inflicting severe wounds on themselves. The failure to feel pain 
after a ruptured appendix, which is normally accompanied by severe abdominal pain, 
led to near death in one such man. Another man walked on a leg with a cracked bone 
until it broke completely. (Melzack / Wall 2008, 3f) 
If we take these miserable and awful phenomena into consideration, we 
cannot but have the opinion that pain is “one of the most remarkable design 
features of the human body” (Brand / Yancey 1993, 12). 
In addition, people seem to intuitively know that the ability to feel pain is 
essential for human beings. If we discuss whether we should treat animals or 
fetuses as important moral beings, as we do normal human beings, we often 
focus on the question of whether they have the ability to feel pain. We cannot 
but have sympathy for living beings which or who are tortured with pain. Pain 
is considered to be a precious gift to us, although it is a gift nobody wants. 
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In this way, if we try to understand the meaning and the value of pain, 
we immediately find a paradox. The paradoxical character of pain is reflected 
in philosophical discussions concerning pain. 
For example, one of the central issues concerning pain experiences in 
contemporary philosophy of mind is the question of whether pain experiences 
can be regarded as a kind of perception of some bodily injury or must be 
understood as essentially a subjective experience with no such intentional 
relation to objective factors. While the perceptual view of pain can be 
interpreted as a reflection of the view in which pain is understood as an 
important natural gift, the subjectivist view of pain could be considered to be 
a reflection of the view that pain has no such positive function in our lives. 
Reflecting the paradoxical character of pain in our lives, the philosophical 
dispute between objectivist and subjectivist views seems to continue 
endlessly. 
However, is the paradox I describe here really a paradox, which we can 
and must dissolve? Are philosophical disputes between objectivists and 
subjectivists really disputes that can come to be settled in one definite way? 
Is it not the case that the seemingly paradoxical character emerges 
because we are obsessed by the groundless prejudice that the concept of pain 
must have one definite single meaning?  
In contrast to this prejudice, is it not the case that, if phenomena of pain 
can be understood as multidimensional, the various characteristics I indicate 
need not be understood as being incompatible, but rather can be interpreted 
as various aspects of multidimensional pain experiences? 
Indeed, in contrast to philosophers, who have long been troubled by the 
seemingly paradoxical character of pain experiences, some physiologists find 
in them not a paradox but multidimensionality. 
In the following, I focus on the multidimensional character of pain 
experiences and clarify the philosophical implications of this view. 
First, to confirm the multidimensional character of pain experiences, I 
refer to some peculiar syndromes of patients known in the field of the 
pathology of pain. 
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Second, to clarify the philosophical implications of the multidimensional 
view of pain experiences, I take up Erwin Strauss’s view of senses, in which 
the characteristic way of sensing pain is the focus in contrast to other senses. 
Third, to explicate the meaning of Strauss’s thesis that pain experiences 
are realized as a “disturbed embodied being in the world”, I consider the 
relation between touch and pain more concretely. 
Through these discussions, I hope to show that the seemingly paradoxical 
character of pain and pain experiences expresses a unique aspect of 
consciousness, which is realized in an embodied being in the world. 
1. THE MULTIDIMENSIONALITY OF PAIN 
“Yes, I feel the pain, but it doesn’t bother me” (Grahek 2007, 131). 
This is a typical response of patients who have received a lobotomy. 
Before the operation, they complained of some definite pain so strongly and 
so persistently that they tried every kind of treatment without any remarkable 
effect. But, after the operation, they no longer complain and answer questions 
about the pain with the statement above. Surprisingly, the results of 
measurements of pain intensity, pain sensation, and pain reaction thresholds 
in lobotomized patients do not differ from those before surgery. Indeed, they 
continue to feel pain as unpleasant. However, according to the researchers, 
the main difference is observed in the affects and attitude of patients toward 
pain. They no longer treat pain with anxiety or fear and become indifferent 
to it.  
This example is already sufficiently perplexing, but there is another 
example, which is more perplexing and difficult to understand with our 
conventional concepts. 
Pain asymbolia patients with lesions in specific areas of the brain show 
similar responses to noxious stimuli as lobotomized patients. They show 
neither emotions of anxiety or fear nor avoidance behavior against painful or 
harmful stimulations. In addition, pain asymbolia patients seem to experience 
no unpleasant feelings. Rather, they sometimes show a positive response to 
painful stimuli and sometimes laugh or smile when receiving such stimuli. 
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Nikola Grahek describes the symptoms of this kind of patient in the 
following way: 
One should remember that just such selective deficits in pain experience and pain 
behavior were characteristic of pain asymbolia syndrome. These patients were quite 
capable of detecting noxious stimuli, discriminating quality, and feeling pain. But, like 
the monkey studied by Dong et al., they were incapable of appreciating the 
threatening nature of such stimuli or displaying any avoidance or escape behavior. 
(Grahek 2007, 63) 
To characterize the experience of these patients, Grahek uses the 
expression “feeling pain but not being in pain”. Feeling pain means, in this 
case, detecting noxious stimuli, and being in pain means appreciating the 
threatening nature of such stimuli and displaying some avoidance behavior. 
However, we must be careful here, because it is questionable whether it 
is appropriate to use the expression “feeling pain” in this case.  
If we confront these kinds of dissociation phenomena, we easily tend to 
interpret the relationship between a normal case and an abnormal case in the 
way that the normal case is constituted of dissociated factors found in 
abnormal cases. However, in the normal case, feeling pain and being in pain 
are inseparably connected, and feeling pain is considered nothing other than 
being in pain. If we consider the dissociated factor found in an abnormal case 
as a building block, with which a normal phenomenon is constituted, it is the 
result of a misunderstanding, which is to be characterized as a “fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness (A. Whitehead)”, i.e., the misunderstanding that a 
factor resulting from an abstraction is considered to be the most basic and 
concrete factor.  
In spite of this risk of misunderstanding, we can learn an important lesson 
from the dissociation phenomenon of pain asymbolia patients. This kind of 
phenomenon shows in a negative way that a normal pain experience is a very 
complex and multidimensional event or process, which is constituted of 
sensory, emotional, and behavioral responses to stimulations. If we take this 
complex character of pain experiences seriously, we can immediately 
understand how abstract philosophical discussions about the qualia problem 
are. If we detach the qualia of pain experiences from emotional and 
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behavioral characteristics, we would only have a diluted experience, which 
could be found only in such a case as pain asymbolia, and it would be far 
from being the essential core of a pain experience. 
A similar thing can be said about the perceptual theory of pain 
experiences. If we understand pain experiences as purely sensory and 
perceptual, they would be like the experiences of pain asymbokia patients. 
Both subjectivist and objectivist views of pain commit the same fallacy, 
namely the fallacy of neglecting the complex and multidimensional character 
of pain experiences. 
Not only in an exceptional case such as a lobotomized or pain asymbolia 
patient can we find complex and multidimensional characteristics of pain 
experiences, we can also find them in much more common pathological cases. 
For example, there is a well known difference between acute pain and 
chronic pain. Acute pain is pain people feel upon sustaining some physical 
injury. On the other hand, chronic pain is pain people continue to feel 
although tissue damage has healed and they no longer suffer from a definite 
physical injury. 
Some physiologists, such as Melzack and Wall, who proposed the gate 
control theory of pain, criticized the naïve view of pain, according to which 
pain is always considered to be connected to some physical injury, and 
emphasized the complex and multidimensional character of pain. 
Pain experience was reduced to a one-dimensional sensory experience that varied 
only in intensity. In the 1970s, however, the definition of pain changed from an 
injury-produced response to a multidimensional subjective experience. Peripheral 
and spinal mechanisms are obviously important. But they are only part of the story 
of pain. Many people suffer severe chronic pain in the absence of any detectable 
physical cause, which forces us to explore neural programs in the brain, where 
subjective experience occurs. (Melzack / Wall 2008, xii) 
Pain is a complex experience, which is determined not only by physical 
stimulations but by a variety of factors, including the past history of the 
patient, the meaning of the injurious agent or situation to the subject, and 
the state of the mind of the subject at the moment of the experience. If we 
take such a multidimensional character of pain seriously, it is obvious how 
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naïve the question is, which many philosophers have discussed for a long 
time. 
When it comes to philosophical questions concerning pain experiences, it 
has been a cliché to ask whether or not pain can be identified with the firing 
of C fibers, which are activated by damage to a bodily part. However, as cases 
of soldiers on the battlefield indicate, there are many cases in which injuries 
occur without any pain experiences. The reverse is also true, namely in the 
case of chronic pain, pain experiences occur without definite physical injuries. 
In the above citation, Melzack and Wall refer to the role of brain activity 
to explain the complex and multidimensional character of pain experiences. 
Of course, brain activities play an important role in pain experiences. But, as 
I would like to concentrate on the task of clarifying the complex and 
multidimensional structure of pain experiences from a phenomenological 
point of view, I will not go into physiological discussions. In any case, if we 
take the multidimensional character of pain experiences seriously, pain 
experiences are to be understood neither as subjective feelings detached 
from every emotional and behavioral response nor as a simple physical event 
of C fiber firings, but as a complex and multidimensional responsive event of 
subjects reacting to the world in which they live. 
To explicate this characteristic way pain is experienced, I would like to 
take up Erwin Strauss’ phenomenological view of the senses. 
2. PAIN AS A DISTURBED EMBODIED BEING IN THE WORLD 
In the well-known work About the meaning of senses (Vom Sinn der 
Sinne), a phenomenological psychiatrist, Erwin Strauss, comprehensively 
criticized the popular view of sensation, which is based on Cartesian dualism 
or a mechanical image of the body. In this view, sensation is characterized 
as a preliminary stage, which prepares materials for cognition. According to 
Strauss, sensation cannot be considered to be a kind of cognition or one 
phase of cognition, but must be understood as a “communication” between 
the subject and the world. This relationship is realized as a responsive 
movement of the bodily self to the meaning of the world. “Sensing is not a 
confirmation of some objective facts and qualities but is a process of 
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confrontation with the world” (Strauss 1978, 386). Every kind of sense, from 
visual through auditory, olfactory, gustative, tactual to pain sense, can and 
should be understood as a way of “being in the world” in its particular 
modality. 
On the other hand, each sense has a different structure and meaning, 
and has characteristics that cannot be reduced to those of other senses. 
Strauss called this relationship between different senses the spectrum of 
senses. 
According to Strauss, as we interact with the world in a particular way 
through each sense, every sensible experience has not only a factor of 
intentionality, i.e., the factor of “directing oneself to (Sich-richten-auf)”, but 
also has a “pathetic” factor (ein pathisches Moment) of “being suffered from 
(Getroffen-sein-durch)”. The way these two factors are combined determines 
the characteristics of each modality. While in the case of the visual sense the 
intentional factor and the objective orientation are predominant, in the case 
of pain the pathetic factor and the character of suffering are to the forefront.  
In addition, interaction with the world includes social and personal 
relations with other persons, so the spectrum of senses implies a variety of 
“I and the other relation”. While each modality of the senses has its own 
particular variety of aspects, a fundamental theme of “I and the other 
relation” varies from one modality to another. According to Strauss, in the 
visual modality predominates a persistent relationship, in the auditory 
modality an actuality, in the sphere of touch a mutual relationship, in the field 
of smell and taste a physiognomy, and in pain a power relationship. We can 
even talk about a sociology of senses (Strauss 1978, 395, 402). 
Seeing and contemplating someone and touching and feeling someone 
have essentially different meanings in our society, just as seeing disgusting 
things on the street and touching and tasting such things are totally different 
experiences for us. 
In this way, the concept of the spectrum of senses includes various 
meanings, but when it comes to pain experiences, the difference from the 
other modalities is especially conspicuous. 
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All of these circumstances are long since familiar to ‘the child who once received a 
burn (das gebrannte Kind). The child shrinks from the fire, because it has become 
clear how differently the same thing reacts to her in the case where it is seen from 
the case where it is touched. Once and for all times, the child had learnt that it makes 
her painful to touch a wicked oven. We all are children who have once received a 
burn and know that, from seeing to touching, we not only exchange visual 
stimulations with tactile stimulations but that the way of contact is changed and that 
we experience things and ourselves in alternating aspects. Through the experience, 
the child learned that the oven, this unique object, can be painfully hot and it is better 
not to touch it. The child does not need to learn the characteristics of modalities of 
senses. The characteristics of senses are directly familiar as a natural gift, which 
makes possible that the child has such an experience about the wicked oven in its 
particularity. (Strauss 1978, 394) 
Unfortunately, not everyone is a child who once received a burn. As I 
have indicated in the first part of this paper, people who suffer from 
congenital analgesia and other types of insensitivity to pain cannot enjoy this 
natural gift. When it comes to pain asymbolia patients, they can “feel” pain, 
which means they can discriminate noxious stimuli, but they are incapable of 
appreciating the threatening nature of such stimuli or displaying any 
avoidance behavior. In this sense, these people touch a hot oven, just as they 
touch a desk or just as they see a hot oven. If we take these possibilities into 
consideration, the description of the difference between seeing and touching, 
which Straus indicates in the above citation, is not sufficient. In the case of 
pain asymbolia patients, seeing and touching are not so different as in the 
case of other normal people. In this sense, what makes us children who have 
received a burn is not the sense of touching in general but the sense of pain 
in particular.  
Indeed, emphasizing the event character of sensing, Strauss himself 
focuses on the characteristics of the sense of pain in the following way: 
When someone feels pain, everything in her is brought into movement. The world 
penetrates into her and threatens to overwhelm her. Feeling pain means experiencing 
directly the disturbance of the relation to the world. Thus, feeling pain means at the 
same time feeling oneself (sich-empfinden), i.e. finding oneself in the relation to the 
world, or to be more exact, finding oneself changed in the bodily communication with 
the world. (Strauss 1978, 18) 
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Strauss emphasizes here the disturbance (Stoerung) character in the 
feeling of pain in contrast to other perceptual relations to the world. The 
disturbance means a disturbance of the relation to the world, which is realized 
through various senses. If we take this characteristic seriously, we must 
consider that even if the sense of pain belongs to one aspect of the spectrum 
of senses, it has a peculiar character, which cannot simply be placed in a row 
with other senses. While various types of sense make the relation to the world 
possible, or open various perceptual worlds to us, the sense of pain functions 
rather to disturb the relation to the world and make one focus one’s attention 
on one’s body and oneself, closing access to the world. To clarify this 
characteristic of the sense of pain, in the following I will consider the 
relationship between touch and pain more carefully. 
3. TOUCH AND PAIN 
When I put my finger at an edge of a desk and touch it moving my finger, 
I feel and find the form and texture of that part of the desk. But, if I push my 
finger at the edge a little more strongly or move my finger along the edge a 
little faster, I feel not only the form and texture of the desk but also the 
pressure from the desk on my finger. If I push my finger even more strongly 
or move faster, I begin to feel pain in my finger. If the form of the edge were 
to be very sharp or rough, I would injure my finger, and the pain in my finger 
would remain even after my finger became detached from the desk and 
perhaps even after the injury had healed. 
In this seemingly simple experience, we can differentiate at least four 
types of experience. 
The first one is the usual tactile experience, which is understood as a 
typical intentional perceptual experience. The attention of my consciousness 
is focused on the object, in this case, the form and texture of the desk. This 
type of experience is sometimes classified as active touch in contrast to 
passive touch, which we experience when we cannot control our exploratory 
activity, for example when some part of our bodies is touched by something 
or someone. 
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The second type is a tactile experience, which is constituted not only of 
the intentional experience of the edge of the desk but also of the feeling of 
pressure on my hand. Even in the first case, we could identify the feeling of 
pressure, if we were to change the direction of attention, but usually attention 
is not focused on this sensation. When we use the Husserlian concept, in the 
first case, a feeling of pressure constitutes a hyletic factor of the tactile 
experience, which is conscious in the sense of “lived” (erlebt), but is not 
objectively conscious. In contrast, in the second case, this factor is focused 
upon together with an objective factor. As this feeling of pressure is localized 
in my finger, it is also a feeling of my bodily part, and if we use a Husserlian 
term, it can be called Empfindnis (Husserl 1952, 144ff). In this sense, the 
experience is considered to be an experience of the qualities of a desk and at 
the same time an experience of my hand, thus it can be characterized as a 
twofold experience of my body and an object, or me and the world. 
In the third type begins a feeling of pain, which takes the place of the 
hyletic factor or Empfindnis that played a role in constituting my body. The 
question is whether this change from the feeling of pressure to the feeling of 
pain brings about an essential change in the structure and the meaning of 
the tactile experience, and if it is an essential change, what makes the 
essential difference. At least in Ideen two, Husserl seems not to be so much 
interested in this question, as he takes up the feeling of pain or the feeling of 
being pierced together with a feeling of pressure and other tactile sensations 
without any particular reservations (Husserl 1952, 144ff). 
As long as the pain is not so strong and is bearable, we can find a similar 
structure in this case as in the second case. If I can direct my attention to 
the object in spite of the pain in my hand, we could say that I “live” through 
the pain and perceive the object tactually. 
However, even if I can continue to perceive the form and texture of the 
object, the appearance of the object is fundamentally changed. The edge of 
the desk begins to appear to me as a dangerous, awful, or wicked object, just 
like a wicked oven, which children touch and receive a burn. These 
characteristics are determined by emotion and value consciousness, and 
captivate my attention so strongly that it becomes difficult to direct my 
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attention to the object in a neutral way. In this way, as the pain essentially 
includes a value-laden and emotional character, the onset of pain changes 
the structure of the tactile experience fundamentally. In addition, as the 
feeling of pain includes an avoidance attitude, my attention begins to be 
distracted from the appearance of the object. It is these characteristics of the 
distraction from and the disturbance of the tactile experience that begin to 
be realized when the feeling of pain begins. 
Corresponding to this process of disturbance and distraction, attention is 
focused on the feeling of pain itself. Consequently, the feeling of pain has a 
self-reflexive character, i.e., the character of feeling oneself (sich-
empfinden), and the subjective character of pain experience comes to the 
fore. But, we must be careful here. This subjective character of a pain 
experience does not mean subjectivity is detached from the body or the 
world. Feeling pain, rather, means an essential involvement in the bodily 
relation to the world, although it is a disturbed relation. According to Straus, 
the world penetrates me and threatens to overwhelm me when I feel pain. 
Feeling pain means suffering, but it means suffering in and from the world. 
The fourth and last type of experience of the episode is the experience I 
have when I let my finger leave the object but the pain remains. In this 
situation, the disturbance character of pain is generalized. Even if I do not 
touch something, I continue to feel pain. A pathetic factor of “being suffered 
from” is not related to a definite object, but is extended to everything in the 
world, which I can touch with my painful finger. The world appears no longer 
to be a place where I can freely engage in various activities, but rather a 
place where I will feel an unbearable pain. “The world threatens to overwhelm 
me”. I live in a different world from the world in which I had lived before when 
I felt no pain. 
If the feeling of the pain in my finger remains further, although the injury 
is healed, the situation becomes much worse. I not only feel pain, but I cannot 
understand why I feel pain or why I am involved in such a disturbed relation 
with the world. Not only does the world threaten me, but I am alienated from 
the world and at the same time alienated from my own body. These are 
typical experiences suffered by chronic pain patients. In the case of chronic 
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pain patients, “the dissolution of the lifeworld” occurs and the patient is 
“worldless” (Morris 2013, 172). 
In the case of chronic pain, we cannot easily say that we experience a 
disturbed relation with the world because we continue to feel pain, but it 
would sometimes be more appropriate to say that because we experience a 
disturbed relation with the world we continue to feel pain. It is no longer clear 
which is the cause and which is the effect. It is rather the case that the 
experience of the disturbed relation with the world is nothing but the feeling 
of pain. Just as emotional and behavioral factors cannot be detached from 
the sensory feeling of pain, the disturbance character cannot be detached 
from the feeling of pain. 
The disturbance character has not only a negative meaning. It can also 
have a positive meaning. If our relation with the world is disturbed, we are 
forced to retreat from the confrontation with the world in some way or other, 
and it makes it possible for us to have a place and time for rest and recovery. 
However, this positive meaning can easily be changed to a negative one, 
because the abandonment of the confrontation with the world can easily be 
fixed, and the patient cannot find a way to the world and the pain becomes a 
kind of trauma and gets stronger. 
Every pain experience has this ambivalent meaning related to the 
disturbance character, whether the pain is categorized as acute or chronic. 
In addition, we can interpret this ambivalent and paradoxical character of 
pain experiences in a much broader perspective, because they can be 
considered to be rooted in the essential character of consciousness itself, 
which is realized as a bodily relation to the world through various senses. As 
far as our conscious access to the world is based on various sensory and 
perceptual experiences, which are realized as an embodied being in the world, 
our consciousness cannot escape from the vulnerability of suffering from the 
world. The factor that makes possible our conscious access to the world, is at 
the same time the factor that makes us vulnerable in our world. How to strike 
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PROVISIONAL CONCLUSION 
Think of another episode. 
A small child, who runs cheerfully away from her mother, stumbles and 
falls on the street. She hits her knee and begins to cry. Her mother 
approaches her and caresses her knee, speaking to her gently. The child stops 
crying and begins to run again. 
In this familiar case, touching the knee of the child tenderly has the 
function of stopping the disturbed relation and opening her access to the 
world again. We cannot simply say that, because her pain stopped thanks to 
her mother’s touch, she recovered her access to the world. It is rather the 
case that because she recovered her access to the world thanks to her 
mother’s touch, her pain decreased and stopped. Just as the feeling of pain 
is inseparable from the realization of a disturbed relation with the world, 
ceasing to feel pain and opening access to the world are also inseparable. 
As we have seen, the multidimensionality of pain experiences shows that 
there are various factors in the world that disturb our relation with the world 
and make us feel pain. But, it is also the multidimensionality that makes our 
relation with the world recover in various ways. The vulnerability and 
resilience of our conscious lives are inseparable and constitute two sides of 
the same coin. The paradox of pain, which I mentioned at the beginning of 
this paper, could be interpreted as nothing but a reflection of this paradoxical 
essence of our conscious lives. 
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